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Introduction
Cities in India are in a state of flux characterized by rapid changes in popu-
lation, land use, and infrastructural arrangements. With approximately 68 
percent of its nearly 1.21 billion residents still living in rural communities 
(Census of India 2011a), the relatively recent rapid growth in India’s cit-
ies has exerted severe pressure on local governments to better supply pub-
lic services.1 Indian cities can be understood as vast provisioning machines 
(Amin 2014) that provide services and infrastructure for sustaining the lives 
of their citizens (figure 6.1). In this critical reflection, we discuss how ques-
tions about open systems and trust— elaborated on in the theoretical work of 
Rao et al. (chapter 3, this volume)— relate to the provision of urban services 
and infrastructure. Internationally, a variety of open practices and systems 
demonstrate apparent promise for improving urban public service deliv-
ery. For example, governments and civil society groups have created open 
platforms and have crowdsourced citizens’ input on diverse issues linked to 
local service or infrastructure needs (Hagen 2011).
Our research— drawing on perspectives of both local government and 
civil society intermediaries— provides insight into public service and infra-
structure issues in a rapidly changing city in India, as well as theoretical 
reflections for advocates and theorists of open systems. We link our study 
to a critique of Rao et al.’s operating theory, discussed in chapter 3 of this 
volume, about trust (or trustworthiness) in combination with open systems 
(or openness), and we apply this to questions about the provision of public 
services and infrastructure in Chennai, India. Rao et al. (chapter 3, this 
volume) have introduced a trust model that applies to open systems in a 
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generic sense but also, they suggest, can be applied to service provisioning. 
Indeed, the study of trust in the development of cities and urbanization has 
important relevance, as Tilly’s (2010) historical work on the development 
of urban trust networks suggests. His work identifies how the earliest cities 
were both shaping and shaped by struggles over their residents’ mutual 
trust commitments. This leads to the question of what trust and openness 
actually refer to in relation to the provision of urban services. Chopra and 
Wallace (2003, 2) conceptually suggest that questions about trust involve 
three interrelated elements: “a trustee to whom the trust is directed, confi-
dence that the trust will be upheld, and a willingness to act on that confi-
dence” (italics original). On the other hand, open praxis, according to Smith 
Figure 6.1
Leaky water pipe in south Bengaluru (Bangalore). 
Source: Sadoway, Gopakumar, and Sridharan (2013).
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and Seward (2017), involves both processes and practices of knowledge 
governance that are free and nondiscriminatory, or open to participation.2
Our research, however, conducted with a variety of intermediaries in 
Chennai, makes us skeptical about whether current forms of digitally 
inspired open development— especially approaches led or seeded by exter-
nal sponsors— are being devised in ways that address key local servicing 
needs. We raise questions about Rao et al.’s (chapter 3, this volume) trust 
model because it positions publics as disembodied feedback channels (that 
is, as external agents in sponsored systems and/or information generators) 
rather than as (pro)active citizens or comanagers of information. Impor-
tantly, their model arguably downplays the complexities of service provi-
sioning, particularly where aspects of overlapping or multilevel governance 
remain the norm (that is, various government bodies and agencies as well as 
civil society groups involved in questions about public services). While Rao 
et al. (chapter 3, this volume) refer to “trust in the sponsor,” our research 
highlights the polycentric, multilevel power dynamics that shape complex 
local governance arrangements (not just single- level sponsorship). Further-
more, our findings highlight the politics of outsourcing or offloading of 
public service sponsorship (and trust) or management to private or nongov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs), including recent debates in India about 
the provision of either free or sharing economy services.3 While Rao et al.’s 
(chapter 3, this volume) trust model identifies broad power dynamics, we 
suggest that questions about specific power trade- offs— such as understand-
ing why local infrastructural and servicing power struggles are occurring 
and how public collective or universal services are being undermined by 
private provisioning proposals— remain crucial to understanding open and 
trustworthy modes of infrastructure and services governance.
Our investigation ultimately focused on perceptions of trust and the 
importance of openness in the provision of public services— such as bus 
shelters, public libraries, water, streetlights, and so forth. To do this, we 
employed three overarching questions to investigate the nature and con-
text of service provision in Chennai: How are public services and infra-
structural provisions being governed? Can open practices improve the 
governance of urban public services and infrastructure, and how? And 
how are trust relations affecting current service provision practices? We 
conducted semistructured interviews in 2016 and 2017 with twenty- four 
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Chennai- based government officials, staff, elected councilors, and civic 
association intermediaries.
The remainder of this reflection explores our findings on public service 
provisioning in Chennai and ends with our critique of Rao et al.’s (chapter 3, 
this volume) trust model.
Chennai as a Provisioning Machine
Chennai has a metropolitan population of 8.69 million residents.4 It is also 
an iconic economic gateway to the state of Tamil Nadu and southern India 
(Sood 2013, 95) and has been dubbed “the Detroit of India” for its growing 
strength in vehicle manufacturing (Krishnamurthy and Desouza 2015, 118) 
(see figure 6.2). The rapid rise in population, automobile use, and land use 
changes have all put heavy pressure on Chennai’s public services and infra-
structure. The Corporation of Chennai (CoC), which Sridhar and Kashyap 
(2012, 99) identify as the “oldest corporation in India,” founded in 1688, 
is the civic body that governs Chennai. The CoC government is led by a 
mayor and a group of councilors elected from two hundred electoral wards 
across the city. However, like other large cities in India, the Government of 
India (GOI or Centre) and the state government play a dominant role in local 
urban infrastructural governance and in steering the provision of services.
Public Service in a Multilevel Governance Reality
A public service is a service where citizens should consider themselves as part-
ners of the service. Citizens right now see themselves as consumers and not as 
participants.
—Respondent 3, member of a civil society organization, interviewed  
on December 22, 2016
The role of cities in relation to the states and Centre is symptomatic of 
the longstanding problem of aborted decentralization in India. Observers 
have linked the longstanding lack of decentralization of financing, profes-
sional staffing, and planning in Indian urban governance (Mukhopadhyay 
2006; Sivaramakrishnan 2007; Sivaramakrishnan 2011) with the corol-
lary of increasingly concentrated power in New Delhi and state capitals.5 
Such maldistribution of political power remains a crucial impediment to 
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building trust and potentially initiating open practices between (and for) 
citizens and local governments. Related to this, Krishnaswamy, Idiculla, 
and Champaka (2017, n.p.) argued that “power should be located as close to 
the people as possible in the smallest political units feasible.” This suggests 
that subsidiarity, or the act or practice of decentralization in a governance 
system, potentially enables an “alignment between democratic authority 
and urban planning power” (Krishnaswamy, Idiculla, and Champaka 2017, 
n.p.). Indexing the degree of subsidiarity in governance— particularly legal, 
political, fiscal, or economic— can thus provide insights into the ability (or 
autonomy) of local governments to shape urban public service provision.
Ideally, open digital practices– – such as introducing public feedback 
channels– – would contribute to better aligning democratic powers with 
public service provision; however, our respondents expressed some skep-
ticism about this. As one informant stated, “e- services can help ease the 
process of getting things done, but they cater only to the educated and 
middle- and upper middle- class people” (Respondent 9, resident welfare 
Figure 6.2
Map of southern India showing Chennai (Madras) on the southeast coast. 
Source: Open Street Map (2018), https:// www . openstreetmap . org / # map=5 / 12 . 983 / 73 
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association, interviewed on October 11, 2016). Another informant suggested 
that public feedback channels lacked responsiveness: “It does not matter if 
the citizens want to give feedback because the CoC is not willing to take 
them” (Respondant 1, member of a civil society organization, interviewed 
on November 22, 2016). The same informant suggested that public engage-
ment was scheduled to minimize input and maximize inconvenience (“in 
the middle of a workday instead of a weekend and often on short notice of 
a few hours”) or in low- accessibility locations. Existing channels for civic 
engagement were also questioned, with one informant observing that “only 
retired citizens would be present at these consultations and they would 
use the forum to voice their problems with other services. Often, political 
henchmen crowd out the room” (Respondent 1, member of a civil society 
organization, interviewed on November 24, 2016).
Despite the problems with public feedback, informants believed that 
engagement channels remained important. For instance, one of our infor-
mants argued that “there should be an official mechanism to organize 
residents of various neighborhoods to discuss civic issues and make represen-
tations to their elected representatives” (Respondent 6, member of civil soci-
ety organization, interviewed on November 10, 2016). Another informant 
noted that “there are mechanisms like the mayor’s meeting every Monday 
morning or the online complaints cell, but these do not work. The city needs 
more decentralized mechanisms for a feedback system to work” (Respondent 
3, member of civil society organization, interviewed on December 22, 2016).
Citizen Action Group (CAG), the Chennai civic association we part-
nered with for this research, also identified an overdependence on centrally 
appointed Indian Administrative Service (IAS) staff  in providing public 
services. The IAS staff members serve on a rotating basis in local govern-
ment offices. Rather than developing Chennai- based capacity in the CoC 
to address local needs, rotating staff or consultancies are responsible for 
public services and infrastructure. Even within the CoC, subsidiarity, such 
as greater local ward feedback mechanisms or powers, is severely lacking. 
This was exemplified in the statement made at the beginning of this section 
by informant R3, who called for decentralization to neighborhoods. Models 
such as Rao et al.’s (chapter 3, this volume) should therefore account for 
the multilevel power struggles that influence setting of public priorities for 
urban services.
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Valorizing Corporate and Consultant- Driven Service Solutions
A main finding of our research revolved around India’s design and imple-
mentation of its Smart Cities Mission (SCM). SCM is a top- down initia-
tive directed by the central government of India, and its formulation and 
financing favors corporate and consultant- driven solutions. SCM is also 
focused on middle- class concerns, such as parking, rather than basic needs, 
such as water provisioning. The high valorization of smart cities and high- 
tech solutions arguably is linked to a fetishization of build- operate- transfer 
and public- private partnership models in Indian cities. Such approaches 
defer to external expertise for how urban public services and infrastructure 
nominally ought to operate (Coelho, Kamath, and Vijaybaskar 2011; Sado-
way et al. 2018; Sangita and Dash 2005). The valorization of corporate and 
consultant- driven solutions also serves to diminish trust in the longstand-
ing local knowledge systems and local staff capacity.
The Chennai Smart City (CSC) initiative is emblematic of public- private 
partnership models, as it favors corporate, technology- oriented solutions 
over democratically governed service provision. The CSC initiative’s pro-
posal was prepared by the global consulting firm Jones Lang Lasalle Inc. 
One claim in this proposal was that extensive public consultations— 
including with elected representatives and NGOs— were conducted. How-
ever, the proposal indicates that only the opinions of the CoC mayor, a 
single member of the Legislative Assembly, and just two business- oriented 
civil society organizations— the Institute for Transportation and Develop-
ment Policy (ITDP Chennai) and Chennai City Connect— were involved. 
There was, concomitantly, limited public engagement. Moreover, software 
and technology vendors were consulted, and their suggestions focused on 
technology- oriented solutions employing sensors, chips, or cameras, while 
largely ignoring local basic service and more basic infrastructure needs, 
such as water, sewerage, and mass transit. One informant, for instance, sug-
gested that “right now, there is a perception of what people want and ideas 
like the elevated expressways, or RFID [radio frequency identification] tag-
ging garbage bins, are proposed” (Respondent 3, member of a civil society 
organization, interviewed on December 22, 2016).
While information technologies could clearly be employed in augmenting 
or potentially improving provision of any public service, the concerns of our 
informants centered on the belief that these technology- and consultant- led 
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approaches were premature to the extent of missing the need for basic service 
and infrastructure needs across the city. Another respondent raised concerns 
about the improper distribution of basic services and how these services 
were being provided to neighborhoods on an ability- to- pay basis rather than 
being universally affordable for residents, saying, “There are some people 
who can afford to pay, but there are others who are not able to afford [to], 
yet officials demand that they pay for all services” (Respondent 9, resident 
welfare association, interviewed on November 10, 2016). Kundu (2011), from 
a public investment perspective, has traced how infrastructure investments 
in India favor affluent neighborhoods and the cities most able to (re)finance 
cost recovery. These comments and observations highlight the chasm that 
needs to be overcome when designing open systems that put local priorities 
for public services or infrastructure first, let alone devising trustworthy tech-
nologically supported solutions.
Some CoC staffers directed civil society groups to consultants when they 
sought information. Our observations indicate that CoC staff are transfer-
ring their responsibilities to consultants and are losing their institutional 
capacity to service local communities in the process. For example, one 
informant noted that “the engineer managing the project would also not 
know or be able to recall what the figures are. Hence every time we required 
any data, the engineer would connect them to the concerned consultant” 
(Respondent 1, member of a civil society organization, interviewed on 
November 24, 2016). One official explained that CoC engineering staff 
“have support from consultants, since these days a lot of projects see the 
involvement of external parties. Though it is an opportunity for officials 
and staff to pick up new skills, they leave it to the consultants to do the 
job” (Respondent 21, city government official, interviewed on February 24, 
2017). This also relates to our earlier observations about subsidiarity, in part 
because central and state- level programs can valorize the professionalism of 
external or private sector consultants rather than developing in- house or 
homegrown public service talent.
Another consequence of valorization (of consultants and corporations) 
is that the CoC appears to be treating citizens deferentially as passive and 
disconnected consumers rather than as engaged political participants. One 
informant observed that “there is a lot of disconnect between the govern-
ment and the citizens, [and] with extremely high use of ICT- based infrastruc-
ture [(information and communication technology)], completely useless and 
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unnecessary ideas are approved and executed, resulting in a major waste 
of public money” (Respondent 3, member of a civil society organization, 
interviewed on December 22, 2016). This raises questions about how pro-
gramming for public services is being devised, funded, and approved— and 
whether governments favor corporate and consultant- driven solutions over 
more universal, democratic, and collaborative service provision. As external 
governmental infrastructure financing projects and external consultant- 
driven approaches become further entrenched in cities like Chennai, open 
practices would appear to be more difficult to devise.
Work- Arounds for Opening Up Public Service Accessibility
Based on the preceding discussion, we suggest that open system advocates 
and theorists need to consider how their approaches could not only open 
up or increase the accessibility to and setting of priorities for public ser-
vices but also how their approaches might unwittingly limit or misdirect 
access to such services. Despite the major challenges hindering demo-
cratic and collaborative service provision discussed earlier, some citizens 
and public officials are finding pathways for accessing services. At times, 
these improvisations involve developing ad hoc solutions or adaptive or 
situational workarounds. Such workarounds have implications for how 
public service provision functions and how service provision systems may 
shift over time. However, we do not wish to romanticize civic or local gov-
ernment workarounds as necessarily innovative service provision models. 
Instead, we highlight them as features of public service systems that signal 
a lack of empowerment and trust- building among local citizens. While we 
have limited space for elaboration here, examples of trust- building from 
our interviews included comanagement of problems with government and 
residents during the 2016 floods, the use of direct public dial phone con-
nections to CoC officials for improving access and accountability, and civil 
society groups working both with and also independent from government 
to address information, infrastructure, or service asymmetries. For example, 
during the 2016 flooding disasters that beset Chennai, one respondent sug-
gested that there was a mutual appreciation of local residents’ needs by 
CoC officials, as noted in the following observation (Respondent 9, resident 
welfare association, interviewed on November 10, 2016): “They worked 
with us like common people without thinking that they were government 
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officials. But now the very same people show their authority and attitude 
when I approach them for any work.”
After the disaster and the common or partnership mode of governance, 
the informant speaking about the flooding suggested that there was a return 
to paternalistic approaches. Issues of fairness in service provisioning were 
also reflected by another informant’s comments: “There is also no equity 
in CoC. Current and retired public officials have clout so their complaints 
are attended to immediately, even from senior engineers” (Respondent 24, 
retired city government official, interviewed on February 16, 2017). This 
highlights how service asymmetries can be shaped by local personal net-
works that also undermine the possibility of building or strengthening trust 
networks among wider publics.
Since mobile phones have become an omnipresent part of familial or 
social networks, the use of direct public dial phone connections to CoC 
officials for improving service access and accountability suggests another 
workaround that has opened up the situation for some residents. In other 
situations, where some communities have been unable to access services, 
wealthier or more connected communities— such as those with active 
resident welfare associations (RWAs)— have also devised workarounds to 
address their needs. Workarounds for those with powerful political or staff 
connections were illustrated in these comments (Respondent 2, member 
of a civil society organization, interviewed on January 10, 2017): “We do 
not find the need to interact with elected representatives like councilors or 
ministers. We have some eminent residents of the city who are part of our 
[RWA] Board and who accompany us to meetings with senior officials.”
Our colleagues at CAG also observed that in Chennai several affluent 
neighborhoods demanded garbage collection twice a day, while many low- 
income areas have this service only once a week or every two weeks. It was 
also observed by our colleagues that repairing roads, water supplies, and 
electricity faults in Chennai has also been shaped by the influence exercised 
by wealthier communities. The workarounds that these RWAs have devised 
could hardly be described as adequate solutions for accessing what an IAS 
official in Chennai (Respondent 21, city government official, interviewed 
on February 24, 2017) described as “rights- based services,” since many oth-
ers remain unable to exercise their right to access public infrastructure.
Issues of infrastructure access revolve around public service provision, 
since some citizens or groups appear to have access and others simply do 
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not. Despite the notable power imbalances, our findings also suggest that 
there remains some hope for more community collaboration, power sharing, 
or governance innovation through workarounds. This was perhaps evident 
in one type of civic workaround that a local group used to generate their 
own data as an alternative to inadequate public information, as noted in 
the following comment (Respondent 4, member of a civil society organiza-
tion, interviewed on January 5, 2017): “For the various studies we conducted, 
the CoC did not have the level of data we required. … We had to first create 
a Detailed Project Report which included a technical, financial, social, and 
environmental study so that we could gather data.” This anecdote suggests 
that some groups were opting for workarounds to garner data for achieving 
improved public services or public responses. Workarounds were also identi-
fied in the local tendency for quick fixes among public agencies, as noted in 
the following observation: “All these agencies do ‘jugaad’ [meaning a quick 
fix] that usually does not completely solve the problem” (Respondent 1, 
member of a civil society organization, interviewed on December 22, 2016).
Workarounds, as implied in our earlier observations on valorization and 
subsidiarity, suggest that distinct local sociocultural and political histories 
shape Chennai’s service and infrastructure conditions. In the following sec-
tion, we relate the Chennai case to the questions about trust and openness 
that we raised at the beginning of this discussion.
Reflections on Public Services and Open, Trustworthy Systems
In this short reflection, we have argued that Rao et al.’s (chapter 3, this vol-
ume) trust model requires a deeper focus on local contextual complexities 
related to public services and infrastructure provision and priorities. Our 
research in Chennai suggests that research into trust and openness needs 
to deeply consider the local power struggles over urban service needs and 
provisioning as well as priority setting, especially where there are diverse and 
changing local priorities. The observations made by our civil society inter-
mediaries and officials within the CoC affirmed this to some extent; how-
ever, additional research and more varied perspectives would be helpful.
On the surface, there also appears to be potential for opening up channels 
for citizen input (such as crowdsourcing) to address concerns about local ser-
vice deficiencies. However, as our previous work in Chennai has found (Sado-
way and Shekhar 2014), transformations in urban infrastructure governance 
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are unlikely to occur unless basic needs and community- defined priorities are 
first addressed, particularly via electoral political mechanisms, as well as being 
embedded in local knowledge systems. Our research has also highlighted a 
need to analyze the overlapping or multilevel power dynamics— among gov-
ernments, civil society, and business— not just trust in single- level sponsor-
ship, which is implicit in Rao et al.’s (chapter 3, this volume) approach.
Additionally, our findings underscored the importance of understanding 
how advocates for deepening the role of open systems and improving trust in 
the governance of urban services need to consider questions about the degree 
of local subsidiarity, the nature of corporate or consultant- driven solutions 
in a given context, and the types of local workarounds that alter or reshape 
urban service provisioning or provisions. Overall, we found the Rao et al. 
(chapter 3, this volume) model underequipped for analyzing the complexi-
ties of urban service provisioning, particularly in fast- changing Indian cities 
and in city regions where multilevel or polycentric governance remains the 
norm. For example, their view of the public as disembodied feedback chan-
nels (external agents in sponsored systems and/or information generators) does 
not capture the dynamics of the public as (pro)active citizens or comanagers 
of information, as our short study in Chennai identified. This also highlights 
the dangers of outsourcing or offloading service responsibilities not only to 
consultants but also to private, charitable, or nongovernmental vehicles. We 
posit that greater citizen control (or cocreation) ought to play an integral 
role in analyzing or actualizing open governance practices. In the view of 
many of our informants— particularly civil society intermediaries who work 
on the front lines with diverse communities— Chennai’s materially poorest 
residents (and also many in the growing middle class) appear to be largely 
left out of local civic engagement regarding future land use or infrastructure 
planning and budgeting.
Instead of simply focusing on improving public services, we have sug-
gested that the first step in improving services and building urban trust net-
works would be to focus on directly involving the public first to address basic 
local public service and infrastructure needs and priorities, such as public 
and community toilets, water supplies, parks, child care facilities, or primary 
health care centers. One of our informants referred to these as “rights- based 
services” that needed to be “requested by communities, rather than individu-
als” (Respondent 21, city government official, interviewed on February 24, 
2017). This illustrates how challenges about public service provision have 
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resulted in continued calls for “shared infrastructural rights” (Amin 2013, 
486) alongside new forms of democratic practices in India’s dynamic cities 
(Coelho, Kamath, and Vijaybaskar 2011, 30). However, as Tilly’s work (2010, 
272) on trust highlights, while cities can serve as platforms for competing 
trust networks, their ability to properly integrate democratic urban gover-
nance with the provision of public services remains historically rare.
Finally, we suggest that further research is needed to explore how both 
rapid urbanization and new urban citizenships are reshaping not only service 
or infrastructure expectations but also questions about trustworthiness and 
openness in local governance. The politics of urban infrastructure and ser-
vices therefore needs to be understood in relation to how both local servic-
ing asymmetries and the local political contexts of class, caste, and gender 
intersect to (re)shape urban government.
Notes
1. We define public services as nominally universal services, governed or managed 
by public bodies, and provided to residents or citizens through a range of infrastruc-
ture. We define infrastructure as sociotechnical “assemblages of public works, techni-
cal installations, and institutional arrangements that mediate flows of services,” such 
as water, waste, energy, mobility, and communications (Sadoway et al. 2013, 3).
2. Smith and Seward (2017) list four key practices: peer production, crowdsourcing, 
sharing, and consumption (for example, reuse, remixing, or repurposing).
3. An example of a private- led sharing economy service and infrastructure initiative 
is Facebook’s Free Basics initiative in India. The initiative involves proposals by Face-
book to bundle free online services, on an open platform, with free Internet access 
(Yim, Gomez, and Carter 2017).
4. Census of India (2011b) data.
5. This included governments ignoring the provisions of the Indian Constitution’s 
74th Amendment, which mandated the decentralization of functions to local gov-
ernments and community wards’ committees (Kundu 2011).
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